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The Struggle over Muslim Personal Law in a Rights-
Based Constitution. A South African Case Study
Abdulkader Tayob - Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen'
Abstract: The recognition of religious law in a democracy provides a
good study of the impact of the constitution on the practice of religion in a
multicultural society. This paper discusses the debate over the nature and
form of Muslim Personal Law and a rights-based constitution in South
Africa. It reviews the debate between competing interpretations within
Muslim society. Secondly, it also places the debate in the context of a
changing legal culture with respect to the practice of religion within a
rights culture.
Post-apartheid South Africa: Islam and Democracy
The South African constitution is unequivocal about freedom of religion,
and the recognition of religious communities in the society. Even though
some form of religious freedom was granted to minority religions, daily
South African life was characterized by suspicion towards non-Christian
religions. Numerous obstacles were placed in their way, and Christian
National Education was the philosophy of its educational institutions. The
new constitution removed the privileged status of Christianity, and granted
equal recognition to all religions. The Bill of Rights in the constitution
declared that 'everyone has the right to freedom of conscience, religion,
thought, belief and opinion' (Article 15.1) and 'persons belonging to a
cultural, religious, or linguistic community may not be denied the right,
with other members of that community to enjoy their culture, practise their
religion and use their languages' (Article 31.1). Through these provisions
the new South African Constitution reversed more than 300 years of the
institutional privilege of Christianity.
Since 1994, Muslims have begun to enjoy tangible benefits of this recog-
nition and acceptance. Muslim leaders have been recognised by the state,
and often invited to open important state functions like the inauguration of
International Institute for the Study ofisIam in the Modern World.
state presidents. The relationship between the state and religious leader-
ship has improved steadily. National television has provided proportional
time for Muslim programming. When radio transmissions were made
available for community radio stations, a number of communities in South
Africa applied for, and received licenses to broadcast Islamic programs.
Muslim community radio stations in Cape Town, Johannesburg, and
Durban, have become extremely popular. Two such stations share a fre-
quency in Cape Town, where Radio 786 (www.radio'Zxo.co.za) represents
the views of Achmat Cassiem, the Islamic Unity Convention, and its
supporters, and the Voice of the Cape that of the Moslem Judicial Council.
The Voice in Johannesburg represents the Muslim Youth Movement, the
most progressive Islamic voice in South African radio (www.786.co.za).
In contrast, The Islamic Voice from the outskirts of Johannesburg present-
ed the most traditional face of Islam. In 1998, a small group of Muslims
complained that this particular radio station was violating its license
agreement for refusing to allow women announcers.' Also from the same
township, Channel Islam (www.channelislam.com) broadcasts an Islamic
message via satellite to a large part of Africa and Asia. Radio al Ansaar in
Durban continues the tradition of guarded modernism and political con-
servatism of its predecessors in Durban.
The recognition of Islam by the constitution has translated into unexpected
outcomes for the Muslim community. While freedom of religion has en-
sured the place of Islam in open society, freedom of expression, and par-
ticularly religious expression, has provided a space for debate and argu-
ment among Muslims that could not have been imagined before. In Islamic
debate earlier, apartheid was condemned while compromises were made
with officials. Moreover, debate about Islam was significantly curtailed in
the authoritative structures of religious bodies. But the divergent dis-
courses that were born under the struggle against apartheid were given
freedom in democratic South Africa. The radio stations provide a strong
indicator of this freedom in a most general sense. One particular site for
illustrating and evaluating the fruit of the freedom of expression has been
the debate over Muslim Personal Law. It illustrates the implications of this
freedom for the ways in which Muslims read the constitution, thought
about the state, and extended the limits of how they related to a democratic
dispensation, The legislative proposals on the recognition of Muslim
marriages impacted deeply in the Muslim community, and is worth a sub-
stantial reflection.
The most dramatic provision for Islam in the Constitution has been the re-
cognition of Muslim marriages or a complete system of Muslim Personal
Law. Paragraph 15 (3) of Freedom of Religion, Belief and Opinion in-
cludes such a provision:
(a) 'J.'his sect!on does not prevent legislation recognising
(I) marnages concluded under any tradition, or a system of relig-
.. IOUS, personal or family law; or [my emphasis]
(u) systems J~y emphasis] of personal law and family law under
an~ ?"adltIon, or adhered to by persons professing a particular
religion.
(b) Recognition in terms of paragraph (a) must be consistent with this
section and the other provisions of the Constitution.
In 1994, the government appointed a Muslim Personal Law Board to pro-
pose a system of Islamic law as provided by the above-mentioned clause
(15(3) (~)(ii». The body.consisted of members from both the religious
leadership and representatives from the youth organizations that were ac-
tive against apartheid. The Board col1apsed by April 1995 when its mem-
bers could not reach agreement.' Recognising the importance of the issue
the South African Law Commission appointed a project committee under
the chair of Mr Justice M.S. Navsa of the Surpreme Court of Appeal. At
th~ end of 2001, after numerous consultations and workshops, this com-
mltt~e produced a pr?posed bill for recognizing Muslim marriages for
pubh~ discussion, which appears to be enjoying greater success than the
Mus~un Personal La,; Board. The process leading to this proposed bill
provides an OPPOrtunity for understanding how Muslims have responded
not only to legal reform, but also to religious freedom, freedom of expres-
sion and the democratic state.
The Muslim Person~l Law Board set about to discuss the system 'of per-
sonal law and family law' allowed by the Constitution. The members
reached agreement on the desirability of the state's recognition ofIslamic
2 F. Haffajee, 'Gender war becomes a radio jihad', in: Weekly Mail and Guardian 1998.
<http://web.sn.apc.org/wmail/issues/980116INEWSIO.html>.
2
3 E. M~o~~ 'Prospects of Muslim law in South Africa: a history and recent develop-
ments, In. E. Cotran & C. Mallat (Eds) Yearbook ofIslamic and Middle Eastern Law
Volume 3, Kluwer Law International London 1996, p. 139. .
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personal law. This agreement w~s significant because.,Muslim p.ersonal
law was a small part of the Islamic moral corpus (Shan ah). Mushm Per-
sonal Law was a product of the nineteenth century, a development that has
not been lost on critics who argue that all of Islamic law should be applied.
The Muslim Personal Law Board, though, agreed that Muslim Personal
Law should be applied to Muslims in South Africa. But the B,o~d split
into two camps on the substantive nature of the law. Women s m~erest
groups and progressive Islamic organization insisted that the particular
article in question should be read in its entirety. For them, the crux of the
matter rested on the fact that the system of Islamic law should be
consistent with the 'other provisions of the Constitution'. They believed
that the system of Muslim Personal Law in South Africa sho~ld be i~t~r­
preted with this condition in mind. And most importantly, th~s condItIon
should ensure an interpretation of Islamic law that would not dIsadvantage
women. The leading and most articulate spokesperson for this new inte~­
pretation of Muslim Personal Law was Ebrahim ~oosa. In b~t? aca~emIc
and popular articles, he argued that many traditional provIsIOns ill the
Shari ah should be regarded as fiqh (positive law), mainly produced by
male scholars whose interpretations need no longer be valid," Making a
distinction between a divine and idealized Shari'ah and humanly construe-
tedfiqh, Moosa argued that the latter could be reconstruct~~ in terms. ~f
the constitution. Moosa taught and inspired students and actIvIsts to revisit
traditional issues in Islamic law. Reflecting this approach, Najma Moosa, a
member of the new project committee, concurred: 'Muslim can only give
practical legal effect to the Constitution if due recognition. is given to.a re-
formed [my emphasis] MPL and it~ i~plementation'.5 ~Ith Moosa. ill the
lead, a strong voice emerged for a significant reformulation oflslamIc law.
But there were some equally strong objections to this reformism. Some
Muslims felt that a parallel legal system for Muslims should be tolerated.
Others were offended by the idea that Muslim Personal Law should be
subservient to the Bill of Rights. Most Muslims believed that Muslim Per-
sonal Law was s.imply an undisturbed part of the the Shar'iah, divine, and
th~s not susceptible to change and interpretation, particularly with regard
to I.ss~es clearly stated in the Qur 'an and the sunnah of the Prophet. The
majority of the Board members rejected the new interpretations offered by
Moosa and h.is supporters. In response to the charge that the 'system'
would be subject to the Bill of Rights in general, some of the proponents
sugg~ste~ that a system of legal pluralism be adopted by the South African
constitution",To~ar, a religious scholar from Cape Town, rejected the
secu~ar const~~t~on w?ich made provision for an Islamic juridical system,
ar~umg ~at It IS ludicrous to suppose that our family and personal law
WIll function p:operly according to Shari'ah in the present set-up'." Citing
the mode~ of Smgapore, h.e called for a completely separate judicial system
~or Muslims under a regune that did not impose its secularism on Mus-
hms:
This is practical, guaranteed, just and fair minority rights in action
and avoids the application of the abuse and cruelty ofthe democracy
ofn~mbers - a seemingly inherited phenomenon in virtually all demo-
cracies: One may .wonder why the aforementioned system [of Singa-
pore} IS not considered seriously. Instead, systems of a secular im-
posed value and administrative system appears to receive apparent
favour. 7
This appeal to legal pluralism was a popular option as it seemed to indi-
c~te that Islamic law ,:ould not be forced to adapt and change. For
different rea~on~, Ebrahim Moosa supported such a notion against a uni-
~orm, authont~nan legal code, but on one based on civil liberties and the
mherent equahty be~een me~ and. women.' The idea of a parallel legal
system se~med attractive, but It avoided the conflict between human rights
and I~lamIc la,: that h~d a~eady been raised in public discourse." Legal
~lurahsm re~amed an idealized option, but the calls for a new interpreta-
tion of Islamic law from a human rights perspective marked the difference
between the views ofToffar and Moosa.
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Without calling for a separate parallel system of Muslim Personal law l.ike
Toffar other Muslims have also appealed to the Limitation ofRights with-
in the ~onstitution: 'the rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in
terms of law or general application to the extent that the limitation is rea-
sonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human
dignity, equality and freedom' (Article 36.1). Those who wante~ a syst~m
of law directly taken from the books of jiqh for the South A~hcan legis-
lature argued that the limitation clause should apply to Muslim Personal
Law. The interim constitution may have given the impression that custom-
ary or religious laws pertaining to personal maters would n?t be subject to
a Bill of Rights. Toffar believed that the absence of a specIfic claus~ such
as 15.3.b should guide the interpretation of Muslim Personal Law m the
interim constitution. He thought that the new constitution placed an
unnecessary impediment on the practice of the Muslim Personal Law: ~is
particular model was followed in Zimbabwe where pe~sonal l~,,:,s or~gma­
ting from customary practices were exempt from equality provIsIons m !he
rest of the constitution. According to Najma Moosa, such a presumption
was plausible in the interim constitution of South ~frica.lO T? c~ear any
such presumption in the future, the fmal South. African. conStItu!Io~ s~e­
cified the limits of Muslim Personal Law by mtroducmg the limitation
clause under paragraph 15.
While Ebrahim Moosa and others argued that elements of Muslim Person-
al Law would have to take into consideration the principles of the con-
stitution, and accordingly revised, religious scholars g~nerally resisted
such reinterpretation under any circumstances. The Muslim Personal Law
Board collapsed in the face of this irreconcilable difference in outlook.
The new committee entrusted with formulating a solution faced a difficult
task. From the perspective of many progressive organizations, the co~mit­
tee was mainly composed of individuals that supported a more traditional
interpretation of Islam. From the point of view of religious lead~rs, .the
committee was bound to produce a bill that conformed to the constItutIOn.
It seemed that the committee was bound to disappoint both groups. And
yet, the committee eventually produced a document that appears con~is.tent
with the Constitution, agreeable to at least some members of the religious
bodies, and responsive to the concerns of women's gr~ups. The ~roposed
bill, therefore, demands an explanation of how the project commIttee was
10 Moosa, a.w. 1998,p. 202.
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able to arrive as such a compromise between reform and tradition. The
appr~ac~ of the committee seems to indicate a unique stance towards the
cons~ItutIOn and the general problem of the non-recognition of Muslim
marriages. Beyond the committee, moreover, a history of cases seemed to
be accumulating in the law courts of South Africa. I believe that the de-
bat~s an? arguments among judges also had an indirect impact on the
deliberations of the committee.
By releasing a p.iec~ of proposed legislation entitled 'Islamic Marriages
and Related, Af~aIrs; the proJe~t. committee apparently gave up the attempt
to p~opose legislation recogrusmg systems (my emphasis) of personal or
family law' (Article 15 (3) (a) (ii)), as the earlier Muslim Personal Law
Board had done. Such an approach had opened up ideological differences
that could not easily be settled. They were reflections of global Islamic
debates, for which there were not immediate resolutions on the horizon.
Instead: ~e com~ittee opted to develop the first provision for 'legislation
r~cogmsm~ mamages ~oncluded under any tradition' (Article 15 (3)(a)
(1)). There IS a subtle difference between the two and the Constitution has
an importan~ disjunction (or) between the two clauses. The earlier attempt
of the Muslim P~rsonal Law Board was bogged down in the development
of a comprehensive system ~f personal law. According to Najma Moosa,
also a membe~ of the committee, nothing short of a complete code would
have been desirable: 'MPL should be codified into a separate code of law
which would form part of the statutory law of the South African legal
system' and the best solution lay 'in codifying Islamic law and enacting a
comprehensiv~ bill or ''uniform Muslim code"'. 11 This approach seemed to
~ave been avoided, The new committee seemed to directly address the cri-
tical problem of the non-recognition of Muslim marriages in South Africa
a sourc~ of great many social problems. Muslim marriages conducted by
Imam~ ~ the mosq~es were not recognized until the promulgation of the
Constitution, Even m the new dispensation, effective court decisions were
ham~trung in the ab.sence of legislation. In the apartheid days, Muslim
marnages were considered 'potentially polygamous' and hence repugnant
to the Weste~ norms ad?pted by South African COurtS. 12 By choosing to
abando~ or SIde-step the Ideological debate in favor of the actual needs of
the SOCIety, t?e proposed bill s~ggested a unique approach. The approach
of the committee confirmed an Important democratic principle of working
11 Moosa,a.w. 1998, p. 201 n. 36.
12 Moosa,a.w. 1996.
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from concerns and issues that directly affected people. The ideological and
theological debates tended to obscure the issues of. recognition t~at the
Constitution sought to address in the first place. By directly addressIng .the
source of the grievances in South Africa at grassroots level, the project
committee made a significant breakthrough in this matter.
A few examples from the proposed legislation illustrate the interface
between human rights and social mores. One of the significant issues im-
pacting on customary marriages concerns the appropriat~ marriageable
age, particularly for young girls, and this is true of Islamic marnages as
well. The legislation proposed consent on the part of both spouses a.s.well
as an eighteen year age limit. However, in view of the fact that traditional
understandings of Islamic law did not specifically prohibit marriage under
the stipulated age, the proprosed legislation allowed he possibility of ap-
pealing to the Minister of Justice for marrying at a lower age. It even went
further by making it possible for marriages conducted between minors to
be declared valid after the fact. The guiding principle seemed to be a
reasonable age (18) but with sufficient possibilities of allowing minors to
marry under certain conditions. And most importantly, the unplication of
marriage between minors would immediately follow. Such mama~~s
would not be declared invalid, for fear that the consequences would mili-
tate against the weaker party (girls or women). A similar reasoning seems
to be at work in the case of registering marriages. Again, it is not absolute-
ly essential according to traditional perceptions about Islamic law to regis-
ter a marriage in a court of law. The proposed act insisted that all mar-
riages should be registered, but allowed for the possibility of recognizing
all Muslim marriages whether they are registered or not.
A very difficult issue arose in the early debate within the. M~slim .com-
munity concerning the issue of polygyny. The proposed legislation did not
completely outlaw polygyny, but insisted that permission for a ~us?and !o
marry again could only be given by the legal system. Such permission will
be granted on condition that the following three conditions were met:
1. the husband has sufficient financial means;
2. there is no reason to believe, if permission is granted, that the husband
shall not act equitably towards his spouses;
3. there will be no prejudice to existing spouses.
Each of these conditions were implied in Qur'anic verses pertaining to this
issue. Moreover, they are the kind of conditions that Muslims in South
Africa would expect to be fulfilled before a polygynous marriage was an
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accepte~ social ~orm. Such conditions were rarely measured with any kind
of scrutiny, ~hlc~ the proposed legislation was bringing into effect. The
proposed legislation also added a further feature by insisting that in the
ev.ent.of a second ~~iage within an existing marriage, the financial im-
ph~a~lOn of ~n additional spouse should immediately be assessed on the
eXI~tIng marriage. Failure to obtain permission for a second marriage was
subject to a R50 000 fine.
The project committee's approach indicated a breakthrough in the broader
debate on Islam and democracy. The earlier Muslim Personal Law Board
did.not simply break down on conflicting readings of the constitution. Dif-
ferIn~ readings of the constitution were signs of some deeper misgivings
relating to the place of Muslims and Islam in a secular democracy. This
tendency was most evident in the approach of Toffar. While Muslims were
enjoying the fruits of an. open society and taking advantage thereof, they
were also exposed to a WIdevariety of modem interpretations of Islam that
r~garded de~ocracy as anathema to Islam. The dominant tendency in that
discourse .rejected democracy as a man-made system that potentially or
actually vlO~ated the terms of~e Shari'oh, presumably a divine system of
laws that SImply had to be Implemented. These ideological challenges
seemed in~actable, as powerful groups on the street of Cape Town and in
oth~r media ?pe?ly ~dvocated a rejection of democracy and the South
African constitution, In the name of Islam. With Muslims constituting less
than two percent of the population, the talk of an Islamic state seemed
totally inappropriate. But in a global world where Islamic ideas were
share?, such noti?ns. received a fare share of support among sectors of the
Mushm community In South Africa .13
~ut the committee's recommendations of a bill recognizing Muslim mar-
nages must also be placed into a changing legal context. As Muslims
themselves were arguing about the nature of Muslim Personal Law an~?er of significant cases were brought to the courts. The judgments and
OPInIO?S expres.se~ at these hearings provide a necessary perspective of an
emerg~g constitutional framework for freedom of religion with respect to
Islam In particular and religions in general. The approach to Muslim Per-
sonal Law should not be dissociated from the approach to different relig-
I3 F. Esack, 'Three IsI~c strands in the South Africa struggle for justice', Third World
. Quarterly, 10,2, ~pnl: 1988, p.473-98; A.I. Tayob, Islam in SouthAfrica:Mosques, Imams
andSermons,University of South Flonda Press, Gainesville 1999.
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ions. As far as I know, the debates within Muslim circles have drawn
attention to the discussion on Customary laws in so far as these also touch
upon family legal matters. But the connection between Islam and other
religious issues have been part of the court records as well. And the solu-
tions offered by the judges have elaborated a coherent framework on the
basis of a comparative framework around the basic principles of freedom
ofreligion on both individual and communal bases.
The key issue in courts revolved around the social values of the pluralistic
society of South Africa. As mentioned already, Muslim marriages were re-
garded by the court as inimical to the bani mores (good values) of the
society because they were always potentially polygamous even when they
were de facto monogamous. With the coming into effect of the first
democratic constitution in its interim and its final form on 27 April 1994
and 4 February 1997 respectively, the courts began to take a different
approach.14 In September 1994, one judgment in fact still hinted that that
new values would still not accept polygamous, or potentially polygamous
marriages: ' ... the principle of gender equality ... may well lead to the con-
clusion that polygamous (and potentially polygamous) marriages are as
unacceptable to the mores of the new South Africa as they ~~re to the
old' .15 But the cautionary comment was expressed on the mam Judgment
which ruled against the plaintiff because the decision under review took
place on 14 January 1994 and the application was brought on 10 February
1994. The new constitution only became effective 27 April 1994. In the
next few years, though, the courts took a very different view of the matter.
It can be said that, in fact, potentially polygamous marriages were regard-
ed as valid under the new constitution.
In many of the cases that then appeared at the courts, the issue of
entanglement with religious doctrine was always considered: In a secu~ar
constitution, most judges were hesitant to take up cases directly or in-
directly impacting on religion for fear of becoming e~broiled into ~oc­
trinal issues. I have used the word 'most' because one Judge ventured mto
a doctrinal issue in a case brought by Christian Education South Africa
14 http://www.info.gov.za/constitutionlI993/1993cons.htm.
http://www.info.gov.za/structure/constitution.htm.
15 'Kalla and Another V the Master and Others', in South African Law Reports (SA), 1995
(1) SA, 261: Transvaal Provincial Division, 1994, p. 270.
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against the Minister of Education. According to the constitutional court
Judge Sachs,
W~ile not d~ubting the sincerity ofthe appellant's beliefs, Liebenberg
J In the High Court found that the scriptures relied on provided
'guidelines' to parents on the use ofthe rod, but did not sanction the
delegation of that authority to teachers. He held that the authority to
delegate to teachers was derived from the common law and the
approach adopted by the appellant was merely 'to clothe rules of the
common law in religious attire '.16
Judge Sachs avoided direct debate but still pointed to the difficulty of
se~~atin~ the purely religious from the secular. The careful sifting of
relIgIOUS Issues that the court was expected to deal with were elaborated
and defmed in a ~UI?ber.o~ ?ther interesting cases. In 1996, the Cape of
Good Hope Provincial DIVISIOn was confronted with the difficult task of
have. to separa~e ~eligi0.us from social issues in an issue involving Islamic
m~lage. Begmnmg WIth a common conception in contemporary Islamic
writings, Judge Farlam feared an intractable doctrinal entanglement be-
cause of the 'continuity of Muslim law, religion, culture and identity'. He
pr~ceeded to a very interesting judgment after he was persuaded by expert
witnesses on both sides that 'in this case do not - despite the fact that there
is a continuity of Muslim law, religion, culture and identity and no clear
barri~r betwee~ the religi,o~s and secular spheres - require any religious
d~c~n.ne to be mterpreted. In 2001, the Cape of Good Hope Provincial
DIVISIOn was confronted with a mosque dispute where the existing Imam
was opposed by a faction in the small town of Worcester. In 2002 theConstitu~ional ~ourt ~~ally gave judgment on the constitutionali~ of
Rastafarians usmg marijuana as a religious right. IS
In each of these.cases, ~t .appears that courts were prepared, and actually
forced, to enter mto relIgIOUS debates that had some effect on social life
that impacted upon rights. The effects of religious practices in essence
became the single most important principle with which the co~s worked:
I would like to discuss two particular cases, in 1996 and 1999 respectively,
16 'Christian E~ucation South Africa Versus Minister of Education', Constitutional Court
of South Africa, 2000.
17 'Ryland v Edross 1997 (2) Sa 690 (C)', in Chronological Listing of Cases Jan 1957-
Dec 2001,2,558: Cape ofGood Hope Provincial Division 1997.
18 it~~e:e v President, Cape Law Society, and Others', in SA:2, 794: Constitutional Court,
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that had a direct impact on how the courts were justifying entanglement
and how their decision were taking up Muslim debates as well. I have al-
ready mentioned the Rylands vs. Edross (1996) where judge Farlam dealt
with the wide-ranging definition of Islam. It was also this case that set
aside the general doctrine that Muslim marriages were potentially poly-
gamous. Judge Farlam argued that the new constitution had clearly s.et up
different principles for the social values of the new South African society:
Can it be said, since the coming into operation ofthe new Constitution,
that a contract concluded by parties which arises from a marriage
relationship entered into by them in accordance with the rites of their
religion and which in fact is monogamous is 'contrary to the accepted
customs and usages which are regarded as morally binding upon all
members ofour society' or is 'fundamentally opposed to our principles
and institutions '? I think not.19
The judgment revealed the impact of the new constitution, then stil~ an
interim constitution, on the recognition of Islamic mores in South African
society. The case involved a woman who demanded a fair share in the con-
jugal estate at the time of divorce. It involved a Muslim marriage c~nd~c­
ted only according to Islamic rites. The judge appealed to the intenm
constitution in turning against a long standing legal tradition that consid-
ered Muslim marriages potentially polygamous and thus against the social
norms of society. Since the constitution recognized the pluralist nature of
South African society, the judge felt comfortable in extending legal recog-
nition to Muslim marriages.
But Judge Farlam then had to consider the next issue of how to interpret
the particular ruling of Islamic law with regard to property acquired during
an Islamic marriage. And this is where he treaded directly into the legal
disputes that were going on within the Muslim community. The co?ten-
tious issue raised in the case was if the wife was entitled to an equitable
share of the property accumulated by the husband during the divorce. Two
competing interpretations were presented to him. The fIrst, led by Ebrahim
Moosa on behalf of the plaintiff, argued that a Malaysian precedent had
been established that property acquired during marriage should be equit-
ably shared. The Malaysian case was based on a synthesis of Islamic law
and custom (adat). Such co-existence of Islamic law and custom was not
19 'Ryland v Edross 1997(2) Sa 690 (C),' 571.
12
unusual in Muslim societies, but only in Malaysia was such a synthesis
legally re~ognized. M.0os~ argued that such an approach ought to be
fol!owed In ~outh Africa In terms of the constitution. On the other hand,
Ahe Moosagie, the :xpe~ witn:ss on behalf of the defendant (husband),
presented the opposing viewpomt that such a condition of matrimonial
property was not implied in Islamic law. He argued that Islamic law
should be applied irrespective of any contextual application and interpre-
tatio? J:le did not present a counter-argument, though, to the contextual
~p~hcatIon espoused by Moosa. But the judge picked up this nuance and
insisted on a rele~ant South African custom. Since the Malaysian case de-
p~n?ed on a ~art~cular customary practice, the judge insisted on finding a
similar practice m the Western Cape. In the absence of such a custom
conceded by both Moosa and Moosagie, the application was turned down:'
In view of the fact that no other Islamic country, on Dr Moosa's own
evidence, adopts this approach, I cannot see on what basis I can
regard the Malaysian rules as being part of the provisions of Islamic
personal law incorporated by the parties into their contract unless a
cus.tom similar to the Malay adat relating to harta sepenciarian pre-
vails among the Islamic community, to which the parties belong, in the
Western Cape.
From the judge's point of view, the recognition of Islamic law in South
African courts would have to reflect the norms and values of the South
AJ:ican Muslim ~omm~ity. The leamedjudge was not prepared to simply
reInte~ret I~lamic law ~n ~erms of the Bill of Rights. The recognition of
Islamic law In the constitution bound the judges to the norms and practices
?f South African society. Since the case opened the debate to a contextual
Interpretation, the existing context of South Africa had to be reflected in
any novel interpretation. In the absence of actual legislation a reformed
approach to Islamic law di~ not st~d much chance of succe;s. The judg-
ment w~s a lan~ark case In that It extended a constitutional recognition
!O Mushm. marnages as such. However, it also indicated that innovative
mt:rp~etatIons ~ere a~so bo~d to face the norms of South African society.
ThI.S IS. a crucial POInt WhICh proved very important in the proposed
legislation.
But ~he .ne~t case pr~duced anoth.er test case for the development of
Musl.lID Jurisprudenc~ In South African courts. This case also involved a
marnage conducted In accordance with an Islamic rite. In this case the
couple were involved in a motor vehicle accident in which the husband
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died. The Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund chall~nged the
survivin spouse's right to the insurance payment on the basis that the
marriag;was not valid according to the law. The case went all th~ waY
d
to
the Su reme Court of Appeal where Judge Ismail 1. Mohamed ISSU~ a
celebrated verdict. He drew on the Ryland v Edross case, but also clarified
the particular disentanglement in terms of common law:
In my view the correct approach is not to ask whether ~he customary
marriage was lawful as common law or not but to enquire whether or
not the deceased was under a legal duty to support the app'ellant
during the subsistence of the marriage and if so whether the nght. of
the widow was in the circumstances a right which deserved protection
.J' . 20for the purposes ofthe dependent s acuon.
In this way he opened the door for the development of common ~aw, not
to reco ize Muslim marriages, but to judge the effects of such actions, He
even w:t so far as to open the door for the courts to evaluate the effects
ofpolygamous unions:
I do not thereby wish to be understood as saying. that if. the deceased
had been party to a plurality of continuing Unions, his depende~ts
would necessarily fail in a dependant's action based on any duty which
the deceased might have towards such dependants.
And fmally, Judge Mohamed left o~en the .possibility or desirability of
separate legislature recognizing Muslim mamages:
I have no doubt that it would be perfectly proper for the lef!islature to
enact such legislation if it considered it necessary, but It does not
follow that the courts should not interpret and develop the common law
t mmodate this need if it was consistent with the releva~t:a:~~~-law principles which regulate the objectives and proper ambit
ofthe dependant's action in Roman-Dutch law.
It seems, then, that the courts have produced two possibilities. In the first
case represented by Judge Mohamed, the courts ~hould ~p~ly common
law 'fairly and creatively and not discriminate agal~s! plal!'tIffs and de-
fendants that seek redress from the courts. The Christian bias of the pre-
vious judgments has been exposed quite convincingly. On the other hand,
20 'Amod (Born Peer) and Another V Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund', in All
Southern African Law Reports, 4, 421: Supreme Court of Appeal, 1999,427/19.
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the debates within South African Muslim society were also radiating
within the corridors of the judicial system. Farlam's opinion indicates that
the general opinion of the Muslim community will favour a more con-
servative approach in the judgment. The legislation tabled for parliament
seemed to take into consideration the issue of recognition. It has, in deed,
followed where the courts have led it. On the other hand, the workability
of its limits with respect to marriage of minors, arbitrary divorce and poly-
gyny still have to be seen. With a vigorous civil society sector that high-
lights the ill effects of these practices in society, judges may yet lead the
legislature in more creative solutions.
Conclusion
This paper has argued that the debate over the Muslim Personal Law has
shifted from an ideological conflict to a case-based approach to problems
encountered within Muslim society. The recognition of Muslim Personal
Law in the new constitution had galvanised different sectors to have their
understanding and interpretation codified in legislation. This lead to irre-
concilable conflicts within Muslim society. Some sections of Muslim so-
ciety remain opposed to any form of legislation that attempted to reconcile
an understanding of Muslim Personal Law and the constitution. This may
be the cause for continuing delay in the enactment of law. After the initial
conflict between progressive and conservative voices, however, the
process took another direction when the focus shifted to problems of re-
cognition. This process adopted a more piece-meal approach to the rela-
tions within the Muslim society, and to the limits imposed by the constitu-
tion. Without any compromise to either Muslim Personal Law or the
constitution, the proposed bill steers a course between the practice ofMus-
lim Personal Law as religion and the effects thereof in terms of the consti-
tution. This particular approach, the paper argues, runs parallel to a history
of the cases brought to South African courts with regard to the practice of
religions. In a number of landmark cases, the courts have charted a course
in the recognition of religious practices on the one hand, and their possible
effects on the other. Muslim marriages can be placed in a similar frame-
work. On the one hand, the particular practice of Islam was respected, but
its effects were subject to the scrutiny of the courts. So far, the cases
appearing in the South African courts have dealt with the problem of the
misrecognition of Muslim marriages. In the future, we may possibly get
more cases where the effects of practices within Muslim marriages will
come for scrutiny as minors, women and other negatively affected parties
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bring their grievances to court. Meanwhile, the proposed legislation still
hovers over the differences within Muslim society. But the future course
of events has been set.
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